

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

October 16, 1967

Dear Dick:

Could the CIA look at ways to minimize our problems with the GVN, if any of the following sequences or combinations should begin at any time in the next year:

1. Direct US-DRV discussions in secret (but known privately to highest levels GVN);
2. DRV-US discussions following bombing cessation--the fact of talks being assumed or known publicly; details of talks secret; and GVN not included at first;
3. DRV-US agreement to encourage talks between GVN and NLF; either as sequel to US-DRV discussions; or independently of US-DRV talks.

While this exercise is, of course, hypothetical, I see great value in having your assessment of the degree of difficulty we would have with the present GVN under each of the above circumstances, and the amount of influence that we could exert on the GVN

25X1

I would also welcome your appraisal of the above formulations and any refinement you want to offer.

25X1

State Dept. review completed

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Richard Helms,
The Director
of Central Intelligence.

Phil
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

TS-188973-07
Cy # 1

